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Aging and Decision Making: A Comparison between Neurologically Healthy Elderly 
and Young Individuals 
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John M. Allman 
 
Abstract 
We report the results of experiments on economic decisions with two populations, 
one of healthy elderly individuals (average age 82) and one of younger students (average 
age 20). We examine confidence, decisions under uncertainty, differences between 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept and the theory of mind (strategic thinking). 
Our findings indicate that the older adults’ decision behavior is similar to that of young 
adults, contrary to the notion that economic decision making is impaired with age.  
Choices over lotteries do not reflect the age differences previously reported in the 
psychology and biology literature.  Moreover, some of the demonstrated decision 
behaviors suggest that the elderly individuals are less biased than the younger 
individuals.(1)There is a greater prevalence of overconfident behavior in the younger 
population. (2) Our results show no significant support for a theory of an endowment 
effect in either population.  (3) Both populations perform similarly on the beauty contest 
task, although there is a modest indication of a higher incidence of confused behavior by 
the older 
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 Aging and Decision Making: A Comparison between Neurologically Healthy Elderly 
and Young Individuals 
 
 
Overview 
Though it is widely recognized that the population of the United States is aging, 
much of our current understanding in the field of individual decision making is based on 
data from student populations.  While this could be a consequence of subject availability, 
it may reflect a common though largely unsubstantiated belief that decision making 
ability declines with aging (Peters 2000).  Many older individuals are productive and 
intellectually viable throughout their lives. Still, others are vulnerable to dementia and 
neurodegenerative illnesses, such as Alzheimer's disease. Our objective in this study is to 
begin to characterize the relationship between economic decision behavior and aging.  
      How well older people make economic decisions is an important issue for social 
policy. Since wealth tends to accumulate over one’s lifetime, a large portion is in the 
hands of older people. Both long-term trends (increased longevity) and short-term trends 
(baby booms) mean that increasing proportions of the population are older and retired. 
Also, older people also are more likely to vote than young people are, so they may have 
disproportionate political influence.   It is conceivable that our scientific model of 
economic decision making, so heavily rooted in studies of 20-year old students, is a 
misleading guide to the behavior of older people.  
 We studied four types of decisions with a potential for age effects. One feature of 
wisdom, which presumably is acquired over a lifetime, is meta-knowledge, accurately 
knowing one's own knowledge and abilities. We assessed this with  self-reported 
confidence on answers to trivia questions. A common stereotype of older people is that 
they are “conservative, dislike taking risk and are “set in their ways”. We tested this 
stereotype using choices over monetary gambles similar to those performed by 
psychologists and biologists .   The monetary gambles include incomplete and complete 
information designs (i.e., where probabilities are known ex ante or unknown).  A third 
group of experiments explored possible differences in willingness to pay and willingness 
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to accept.  In these experiments the choices involved gambles for everyday objects (e.g. a 
coffee mug). It has been suggested that observed differences are due to an asymmetry of 
preferences between losses and gains, which might be exacerbated by age. Finally, both 
younger and older subjects participated in beauty contest games, in which strategic 
thinking plays a central role. In each case the experiments were taken from the literature 
allowing us to focus on age differences rather than on theories behind the experiments.   
 
Subject Population and General Experimental Design  
We interviewed  two age groups: a young population (ages 18-26, 51% female) 
and an elderly population (ages 70-95, 70% female).  The older subjects (N=50) serve as 
controls for the Alzheimer's Disease Research Center (ADRC) at the University of 
Southern California (USC). Based on annual cognitive and behavioral testing, the older 
individuals are considered neurologically healthy having no history of dementia or 
mental illness.  The student population (N=51) consisted of healthy undergraduates from 
a junior college near Caltech. The younger participants have between 12 and 16 years of 
formal education. The older population is highly educated relative to their age group   
78% have more than 12 years of education and 60% have 16 or more years. As other 
populations of older adults  (e.g. individuals with Parkinson disease or other aliments or 
people in assisted living arrangements) may be more difficult to study, we chose a 
population of healthy high-functioning individuals for our first attempt to study decision 
making in the elderly.  
 Each subject completed an individually administered interview, involving a 
written questionnaire and several interactive tasks. On average subjects of both 
populations took fifty minutes to complete the interview. For all areas of the investigation 
involving monetary rewards, real cash was used. This method of collecting data is 
expensive, and, for many populations of older adults living outside of retirement 
                                                 
2 These populations are not representative of their age groups, though they are reasonably well matched on 
education level. Representative sampling would be a natural next step but would require a much more 
complex design. 
3 Note that college education only became widespread in the years following World War II, rising from 1.5 
percent in 1950 to 5 percent in 1980 (U.S. Government (2001),Walton and Rockoff (1998)). So our older 
subjects, who were born around 1920 on average, are much more likely than their peers to have graduated 
from high school or gone to college.  
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communities, individual interviews may be a necessary burden. The same method was 
used for all subjects  to avoid confounding age with the method of data acquisition.   
 
Confidence 
Research suggests that non-expert individuals are typically overconfident; they 
overestimate the quality of their own abilities or knowledge (Svenson 1981, Weinstein 
1980) and state extreme probabilities more often than they should. Work in economic 
theory, particularly with business-related forecasting, has provided further support for 
this behavioral phenomenon (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). 
The reasons for overconfidence when answering trivia questions  are a subject of 
intense debate among decision theorists (Ayton and McClelland 1997). Three prominent 
explanations have emerged. One argument is that it is an illusion created by 
asymmetrically misleading items in investigation methods (Juslin 1994, Gigerenzer et al. 
1991) For example, one question used was: which city is farther north Rome or New 
York. Most Americans seem to believe that the correct answer is New York, and are 
quite confident, even though that answer is incorrect. Soll (1996) found that 
overconfidence persists even when questions are sampled randomly. Some contend that 
overconfidence results from subjects basing their answers on a reasonable probability but 
responding with error, which biases their reported probabilities in the direction of 
overconfidence (Erev 1994). Wallsten (1994) found overconfidence after adjusting for 
this source of bias. A third explanation is that overconfidence is a cognitive bias due to 
anchoring on an intuitive answer or snap judgment, and adjusting insufficiently for the 
ways in which the answer could be wrong (Kahneman 1996).  An important qualification 
is that many expert populations e.g. weather forecasters (Murphy, 1984), blackjack 
dealers and others (Camerer, 1995, pp. 590-592), and highly experienced subjects in 
repeated games (Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2002) do not show overconfidence in their 
fields of expertise.  
We investigated confidence by providing subjects with twenty trivia questions on 
diverse subjects (see Appendix 1). Each subject answered the same set of twenty general 
knowledge questions. All questions had two possible answers . Subjects were instructed 
to select an answer and then provide a confidence assessment (50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, 
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90% or 100%) of their choice. Older subjects did somewhat better answering 74.1% of 
the questions correctly, while 66.1% of answers given by the younger subjects were 
correct.  
For both groups we combined all the answers in which subjects gave the same 
confidence assessment, and calculated how often they were right. Good calibration means 
that the fraction of correct answers should be about equal to the stated confidence level. 
For example, on questions where subjects said they were 80% confident, they should be 
right about 80% of time. If subjects are well calibrated, then a graph of the percent 
correct against the confidence levels should lie near a 45° line. Points below the line 
would represent overconfidence and points above  would show underconfidence. Figure 1 
contains these scatters for both older and younger subjects, along with standard errors and 
significance tests for differences in accuracy and in distribution of responses.  
Both groups of subjects display overconfidence at some levels and neither group 
shows underconfidence at any level. Older  subjects' assessments are significantly more 
accurate at 60% (p<0.05) and 70% (p<0.01) reported degrees of confidence. The older 
subjects do exhibit overconfidence when reporting confidence levels of 80% and 90% 
(17% of their total responses), but younger subjects are overconfident at all the 
intermediate levels of reported confidence (48% of their total responses).  One 
interpretation of these results is that older subjects have learned through experience to 
temper their overconfidence and, thus, look more like  experts.  
       The groups also differed in their response distributions. The younger subjects spread 
out their responses across the confidence levels: half of their selections were evenly 
distributed among the intermediate confidence levels. In the older subjects, the majority 
of the responses were given with either 100% or 50% confidence (in calibration terms, 
their assessments had “higher resolution”). While older subjects reported a confidence of 
100% significantly more often than the younger subjects (p<0.025), they made 
substantially fewer selections with 60%-80% confidence (p<.05 for each group). The 
percentage of correct responses when reporting 100% confidence was about the same for 
the two groups (94% correct for the older population and 92% for the younger subjects). 
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Decision Making Under Uncertainty 
    Two gambling tasks are employed. The first task is a modified version of the 
card-deck gambling task of Bechara et al. (2000) that has been used extensively in the 
biology and psychology literature.  
 In the modified gambling task, subjects selected cards from one of two decks to 
earn cash. The cards were pre-organized so that one deck (A) had an overall loss of $2.50 
every ten cards and the other deck (B) had an overall gain of $2.50 every ten cards. All 
the cards in deck A gave a $1.00 on every turn but were occasionally accompanied with 
losses, $7.50 for example (for a net loss of $6.50). The other deck B gave a smaller gain 
for each card, +$0.50 but had smaller occasional losses. Subjects did not know the 
composition of the decks (given in Appendix 2).  Subjects were instructed to select the 
top card of one of the decks, and that they could switch between decks at any time during 
the task. Each subject selected 50 cards one at a time, but was not informed in advance 
about the total number of draws. Deck A has a lower mean payoff and higher variance 
than deck B. Since subjects do not know the composition of the decks, there is no optimal 
strategy. In the neuroscience literature the choice of deck A is treated as a mistake. 
Bechara et al. conducted their gambling task with a population of healthy adults 
and a population of individuals with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM). 
They found that the VM patients, unlike the healthy adults, did not gradually shift their 
choices to the more advantageous deck B. Other studies employing Bechara’s design 
have found that individuals with damaged orbitofrontal cortex have an impaired ability at 
adapting their deck preferences to deck B in comparison to control subjects (Damasio 
1994).  Denburg et al. (1999) administered this task with a population of healthy older 
adults and argued that the older individuals behave similarly to the frontal-lobe-damaged 
subjects.  Our results do not confirm this finding. 
 Consistent with the results of the Bechara study, our subjects gradually 
concentrated their choices on   deck B The beginning phase of the task was an 
exploratory period in which both populations sampled each deck equally. For the next 20 
                                                 
4 Note that choosing deck A is utility-maximizing if a person is sufficiently risk-preferring, so that higher 
variance is preferable (a risk-preferer will sacrifice mean payoff to get more variance). The neuroscientific 
literature, however, uniformly treats the deck A choice as a mistake rather than an expression of risk 
preference.  
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draws subjects shifted towards deck B drawing on average 8 of the 20 cards from deck A 
In the final  10 draws both groups largely abandoned deck A: on average the younger 
subjects chose deck A  2 times of 10 and the older subjects chose deck A 3 times of 10. 
In summary both populations appear to have adapted the same way to the payoffs.  
In our second gambling experiment subjects were asked to make six choices. For 
each choice subjects had to select one of two decks of 10 cards. Unlike Bechara et al. 
experiment, subjects saw the payoffs from each of the ten cards in the pair of decks 
before making their selection. Once they decided which deck they wanted, the ten cards 
were shuffled and the subjects selected one card. In all six choices one of the two decks 
had a positive mean payoff, and the other  deck had a nonpositive payoff. The deck with 
the positive average payoff had a smaller variance. A total of six choices were given to 
36 of the older subjects (this task was added after the first 14 interviews were completed) 
and 51 of the student subjects The decks used are shown in Appendix 2. 
We do not see significant differences in behavior of the younger and older 
subjects. Somewhat surprisingly subjects more often than not chose the lower average 
payoff decks. Among older subjects, 58% chose the lower payoff decks on  four or more  
of the six choices, while 59% of the younger subjects did so (Table 1 and Figure 3). The 
proportions were similar across age groups for each of the six different deck pairs  Older 
women were significantly more likely than older men to choose the lower mean, higher 
variance decks (Figure 4).Of the 54 choices made by the older male subjects, 17 were of 
the lower average payoff decks while the older females chose those decks on 96 of 
their162 choices. This is the only significant gender effect we found in any of the tasks 
studied. We tested if there were any order effects of previous winning or losing draws, 
but found no significant effects. 
 
 
Willingness to Pay/Willingness to Accept Asymmetry 
Observed differences between stated willingness to pay (WTP) for an item and 
willingness to accept payment (WTA) for the same item have been a subject of extensive 
research. In previous investigations of this behavior, individuals have been divided into 
two groups: sellers and buyers. The sellers are given an item and told that they are the 
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owners of it. They are then asked to indicate the minimum they would accept to sell the 
item, the WTA. Buyers are shown the same item and are asked to indicate the maximum 
they would be willing to pay for the item, the WTP.  The consistent tendency for the 
WTA to be greater than the WTP is the asymmetry that has attracted the attention of 
economists.  
The observed differences between willingness to pay and willingness to accept 
have been labeled an “endowment effect”, intimating that the phenomena is due to loss-
aversion to the domain of choices over bundles of goods and money (Thaler, 1980; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991;Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec,2003).  The theoretical 
idea is that an individual who owns a good anticipates a loss from the sale and, thus 
requires a higher payoff than the individual would pay to acquire the good if it were not 
owned (Kahneman 1991, Kahneman 1990, Knetsch 1989, Knetsch 1984).  In other 
words, the willingness to accept (WTA) exceeds the willingness to pay (WTP).  
Some recent experiments support a  claim that the observed differences between 
willingness to pay and willingness to accept are  related to experimental procedures and 
have nothing to do with preference asymmetries (Plott and Zeiler (2003)) or are 
eliminated by trading experience (List, 2003). Older people are often presumed to be 
more conservative and more likely to avoid risk.  If this is true, then it would seem 
natural to expect loss avoidance to be stronger in the older populations. Alternatively, it 
may be that older people having experienced the loss of many everyday items have 
learned that such losses are not that serious, and may not exhibit an endowment effect. In  
either event, by testing for an asymmetry between WTA and WTP, using the controls for 
subject misconception, we are able to test endowment effect theory and to investigate 
possible preference differences between young and old under circumstances that could 
exacerbate these differences if endowment theory is correct. 
In our experiments subject populations were divided into groups: sellers and 
buyers. For each round, sellers were told that they own the item in front of them (buyers 
were shown the item, but  not told that they own it). The subjects were then asked to 
report their value for the item. Sellers were instructed to offer the minimum they would 
                                                 
5 Recent research has produced evidence of such an asymmetry through brain imaging (see Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Prelec, 2003) 
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accept to give up the item, while buyers were instructed to offer the maximum they 
would be willing to pay for the item. The subject’s offer was then compared to a fixed 
offer. The fixed offer was randomly determined and not based on the actual value of the 
item (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak (1964)). For sellers, if WTA was less than or equal 
to the random offer, they gave up their item and received the amount of the random offer. 
If the WTA was greater, they kept the item.  For buyers, if the WTP was greater than or 
equal to the random offer, they  purchased the item for the amount of the random offer. If 
the WTP was less than the amount of the random offer, they kept their money. Subjects 
were informed that the fixed offers have been determined by a random method, which 
would be revealed at the end of the interview (Plott and Zeiler (2003)). 
There were a total of three rounds in the task: the first two were hypothetical and 
the last was the actual round. A pen and a picture frame were used in the hypothetical 
situations, and a coffee mug was used for the actual situation. Only the actual round had a 
real payoff, either the mug or the cash value of the fixed offer. 
On the third round when each subject has determined their offer they wrote it on 
an index card and place it inside an envelope (both items were provided) along with the 
amount of the WTA or WTP. Subjects were informed that the interviewer will not know 
their offer or their outcome. This was done to ensure that the subject’s offer was 
anonymous and not influenced by the presence of the interviewer. The subjects 
subsequently received either the mug or the return of  their money in the mail. 
 
The data exhibit no significant differences between WTA and WTP in either 
group. Thus, for these findings, endowment effect theory must be rejected.  We also 
conclude that there is no significant difference between the young and the old.   
 Excluding the difference of reference states, the experimental design was identical 
for both the seller and buyer groups.  The median seller price is higher than the median 
buying price for each sample (Table 2). In the actual round, the coffee cup round, the 
median offer price for the sellers in the older population is $2.50 and the median buyer 
price was $2.00. In the student population, the median seller offer is $2.25 and the 
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median buyer offer was $2.00. These differences are not significant for either group (p> 
.25). Pooling the young and older subjects gives an insignificant difference between 
WTA and WTP. The median offer price of sellers is slightly higher for the other rounds, 
excluding the first hypothetical round for the older subjects.  Thus, in both groups the 
results are consistent with those  of Plott and Zeiler .  
 
Strategic Thinking 
 In many situations a decision maker's outcome does not depend on his or her own 
choice alone but upon the choices of others. Investing in the stock market, crossing an 
intersection where there is opposing traffic, and playing poker are all examples.  A game 
known as the “p-beauty-contest” has been widely used in economic studies to examine 
some of the simplest principles of interdependent decision making (Nagel 1995, Nagel 
1999, Stahl 2001).  In the “p-beauty-contest” game subjects select a number in the range 
[0, 100] and the winner is the individual whose selection is closest to a proportion of the 
average of all the numbers selected. In our design, we used p=2/3. Since the winning 
number hinges on the average of all the numbers selected, the subject needs to determine 
the numbers other players will choose, having been told that others are trying to do the 
same.  
The simplest strategy is to assume that other people choose randomly and 
therefore the average will be around 50. In this case the best decision would be to choose 
a number that is (2/3) 50 or 33. Yet, if the subject continues with this rationale he or she 
will consider that the other subjects may also use this strategy and therefore the average 
would decrease, becoming (2/3) 50. In this case, the best strategy is to choose the number 
that is (2/3)2 50 i.e. 22. This line of strategies can be viewed as progressive steps of 
reasoning, the strategy of each step being given by 50(2/3)n.  In dozens of studies with 
students, business executives, and individuals responding to newspaper experiments, the 
evidence has shown that people’s choices are limited to the first, second, and sometimes 
third steps of iterative reasoning. Formal models, which assume an average of 1.5 steps 
generally predict better than conventional equilibrium concepts when people face a game 
for the first time (e.g., Camerer, Ho and Chong, 2003, in press).  
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Given that thinking steps have been shown to be modestly correlated with the 
efficiency of working memory (measured by digit span; see Devetag and Warglien, 2003) 
and aging may reduce working memory or, potentially, some other cognitive process 
related to strategic reasoning, these changes could lead older subjects to use lower values 
of n, and to choose higher numbers than younger subjects. 
For the actual task, participants were told that they would be playing with nine other 
individuals from their research population, who had gone through identical procedures 
before providing their numbers. A written questionnaire was used to outline the game 
procedures and to inform participants that the winner of the competition would earn 
twenty dollars, which would be sent as cash by US mail after the winner had been 
determined (within two weeks of interview). 
Our results show that both the old and young samples behave similarly on this task. The 
majority of responses are clustered around the first step (50(2/3) =33) and the second step 
(50(2/3)2=22) of reasoning (Figure 5). Overall the behavior for this task is very similar 
for both populations. High responses (over 50), perhaps reflect confusion. The number of 
responses above 50 is somewhat greater for the older subjects (6 out of 33 responses 
above 50), than for the younger subjects (3 of 51 responses above 50). After the first 17 
interviews were conducted the instructions were changed because of a high incidence of 
possibly confused responses. Revised instructions were used for 33 of the older subjects 
and all of the younger ones.   
 
Summary and Conclusions     
We conducted four sets of experiments using  50 high functioning neurologically healthy 
older subjects (average age 82) and 51 healthy students (average age 20).  The 
experiments were chosen on two criteria. First, we used experiments that a priori seemed 
likely to elicit different responses from the two groups. Second, we wanted experiments 
that had been used in the economic, psychological or neuroscientific literatures so that we 
                                                 
8 The reason for the smaller number of responses from the older subjects is that after 
seventeen interviews we reviewed the results and found what seemed an unusual number 
of responses indicating possible confusion with the task. We revised the instructions, 
used the revised versions for all other subjects. 
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could concentrate on observed behavior of the two subject pools rather than on justifying 
the particular experiments or on the theories supporting them. 
 
The general conclusion is that the performance of the two groups of subjects is 
remarkably similar. With one exception we do not observe significant differences by 
gender.  
     Elderly individuals demonstrate highly accurate meta-knowledge evaluations. The 
distribution of responses shows that older individuals more frequently respond that they 
are completely certain (100%) or completely unsure (50%) than do the younger subjects. 
These results support the view that older individuals have more accurate beliefs about 
their knowledge and its limitations. 
Evidence from the gambling experiments contains no significant differences in 
the behavior of young and old subjects.  In the gambling task with incomplete 
information, both populations, by the third 10-draw interval, demonstrate a preference for 
the higher paying deck.  The two populations exhibit no difference in tendencies.  Thus, 
our findings largely disagree with Denburg et al. (1999) who reports that older adults 
have tendencies similar to patients with fontal-lobe damage.  However, in the final 10-
draw interval the older subjects  chose the lower paying deck  more often than the 
younger subjects (but not significantly so), consistent with Denburg, et.al  Whether or not 
experiments with larger number of draws would become consistent with the Denburg et 
al. results cannot be determined without further experiments. 
In the gambling tasks with full information, the average tendency of the older and 
younger groups was to make proportionately more choices from the lower average 
payment and higher variance decks than was observed in the incomplete information 
task. The tasks differ on two major dimensions, complete versus incomplete information 
and one draw versus repeated draws. In the complete information experiments it is 
possible that choice could be sensitive to the format in which the information is displayed 
as suggested by regret theory (Loomes and Sugden 1982). Explanations along these lines 
cannot be confirmed without more experiments. We do not offer an explanation for the 
difference, but do emphasize that the observed behavior is the same in both populations. 
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From our investigation, one gender difference is identified. Older females are 
more likely to select the low payoff high variance deck than are older males  
Economic studies tend to show that the financial choices of men are more risk-seeking 
than those of women, an observation that has been frequently attributed to 
overconfidence among males (Barber 2001, Powell 1997, Prince 1993). The majority of 
economic studies focus on younger subject populations for which the distribution of risk 
behavior may be different from that of an elderly population.  
The gender gap in life expectancy, observed across cultures, has been linked to 
higher incidences of risk behavior (substance abuse, violence, and suicide) among men in 
both biological and psychological research (Allman and Hasenstaub 2000, Girard 1993, 
Thom 2003). This could account for the observed conservatism among surviving men 
and, also, the disproportionate representation of females in the neurologically healthy 
elderly population.  Further research is required to determine if the effects observed in 
our data are representative of that population. 
  In our investigation of the WTP and WTA difference, we found that there was not 
a significant difference  between the median offer price of the seller and buyer groups in 
both the old and young populations (although the older subjects named higher prices in 
the hypothetical rounds, both as buyers and as sellers).We adopted the experimental 
procedures of Plott and Zeiler (2002) who found no significant difference between WTA 
and WTP. Our results are consistent with theirs. 
 We began this work as a pilot study to determine the feasibility of systematically 
studying cognitive process in older individuals. Our sample size is necessarily small as 
the data collection method was time consuming and expensive. Overall, the findings of 
this comparative study, including the results from the beauty contest task, present 
compelling evidence for the stability of decision making behavior with age— the choices 
of the 80 year olds and 20 year olds are generally the same. Aside from a minor 
propensity to make more confused responses on the theory of mind task (the beauty 
contest game), there is no evidence of impairment in the reasoning and choices of the 
elderly population we studied on any of the areas of the survey. This is in itself an 
important finding, since it is a widely held notion, even among decision researchers, that 
decision making faculties decline with aging. Our results counter this notion and show 
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that decision behavior is robust for at least a subset of the healthy elderly population. At 
the same, there are some intriguing differences, which should be investigated in further 
research. Given the increasing size of the elderly population in the United States and their 
share of personal wealth, additional timely studies are needed.  
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Figure. 1 
Proportion of correct responses (± standard error of mean (SEM)) for a given confidence 
level out of the total responses with that confidence. The width of each bubble reflects the 
percentage of responses that were given at each confidence level out of the total 
responses. Exact percentages for response distribution are labeled next to bubbles for 
each population.   
*    The hypothesis that the proportions correct are the same is rejected at p<.05 
** The hypothesis that the proportions choosing this response are the same is rejected at p<.05 
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Figure 2 The plot indicates the results for the median number of cards selected from 
Deck A, the deck with high variance and negative expected value (-$2.50 per interval). 
Selections from Deck B would simply be ten minus those of Deck A. Subjects with no 
switching behavior were removed from the data pool. The difference in the number of 
choices in the final 10 draws is not significant (p-value 0.14). 
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Figure 3 Each subject was given six choices. The plot indicates the percentage of 
subjects against the number of times the deck with a lower average payoff and larger 
variance was chosen out of the six choices.  
* Mann-Whitney, P = 0.10 
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Figure 4 Choices by elderly men and women. The plot indicates the percentage of 
subjects against the number of times the lower payoff, higher variance deck was chosen 
out of the six choices.  Mann-Whitney test showed the difference is significant (p<0.01).  
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        Stem and Leaf Plots for the Beauty Contest Game 
 
 Younger Subjects   Older Subjects 
 
0 47 
 
1 5679     4788 
 
2 000023478889   12255677779 
 
3 022333345555556677788  2355557 
 
4 222235    457 
 
5 0002     0028 
 
6 58     25 
 
7      5 
 
8      6 
 
Figure 5 The plot shows the total number of subjects and number selections for the p-
beauty contest (theory of mind task). Players try to choose a number close to 2/3 times 
the average of ten numbers provided by participating subjects. The values in the left 
column are the “stems” or the tens digit, and the values on the right list the digits. Each 
numerical response is therefore 10 times the left column stem plus the middle and right 
column “leaf” value. For example, the most extreme guesses were 4, given by a younger 
subject, and an 86 given by an older subject. Values greater than fifty may indicate 
confused responses. Older subjects were more likely to give a response above 50 
(p=0.07). 
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Table 1. Percentage of Subjects Preferring Low Payoff Deck 
Lotteries 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Older 
Subjects  64 [N=50] 56 [N=50] 66 [N=50] 53 [N=36] 53 [N=36] 36 [N=36] 
Young 
Subjects 
[N=51] 55 67 63 73 61 47 
 
Table 1. The table shows the percentage of subjects in each of the populations who chose 
the lower average payoff deck. Percentages are shown for each of the six lotteries. For 
each lottery, participants were given the option to randomly select one card from one of 
two decks, composed of ten cards of varying monetary reward/loss. In each lottery, one 
deck had zero or negative expected value and one had positive expected value and 
smaller variance. Appendix 2 shows the exact deck compositions that were shown to 
participants.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Statistics for WTA/WTP [Mean, Median (Standard Deviation)] 
Round Hypothetical 1 (Pen) 
Hypothetical 2 
(Frame) Actual (Mug)  
Older WTA [N=25] 8.84, 3.5 (17.82) 6.61, 7 (3.74) 2.48, 2.5 (1.7) 
Older WTP [N=25} 5.13, 3.95 (6.12) 9.34, 6.5 (6.21) 3.25, 2 (3.04) 
Younger WTA [N=26] 2.2, 1.5 (3.2) 7.46, 5 (8.63) 3.88, 2.38 (4.88) 
Younger WTP [N=25] 1.62, 1.25 (1.12) 4.98, 4 (3.59) 2.24, 2 (1.75) 
 
Table 2. The data shows the mean, median (standard deviation) for the WTAs (seller 
offers) and WTPs (buyer offers). Data for each of the three rounds and the items used are 
given. Only the actual round used real cash. For the actual round the difference between 
the WTA and WTP prices within each group is not significant (p>0.25). 
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Appendix 1: Trivia Questions 
 
All questions were presented in the same format as question 1. 
 
1. The population of Los Angeles is: 
3,400,000                            4,500,000 
How confident are you in the answer you have chosen?  
50%  60%       70%        80%         90%   100% 
Order Question Answer Choices 
2 Abraham Lincoln was president from: (1861-1865, 1862-1866) 
3 The present chief justice of the Supreme Court: (John Ashcroft,  William Rehnquist) 
4 The population of London is: (10,000,000, 7,000,00) 
5 In what country is the Cannes film festival held? (Canada, France) 
6 What musical features the songs “America” and “Maria”? (West Side Story, A Chorus Line) 
7 Which is a natural satellite of Earth? (Moon, Sun) 
8 What do a penny, nickel, dime, and quarter add up to? ($0.41,   $0.51) 
9 What does the acronym TWA stand for? (Trans West Airlines,  
Trans World Airlines)  
10 Which actress won an Academy Award for her role in 
Shakespeare in Love? 
(Julia Roberts, Gwyneth Paltrow) 
11 Who played Green Bay in the first Super Bowl? (Kansas City Chiefs,  
Washington Redskins) 
12 What is the birthstone for May? (Diamond, Emerald) 
13 What does an anemometer measure? (Wind Speed, Humidity) 
14 What are Cygnus, Pegasus, and Phoenix? (Egyptian gods, constellations) 
15 Who had “the face that launched a thousand ships”?  (Helen of Troy, Cleopatra) 
16 On a traditional clock, which number is 180 degrees from 5? (1, 11) 
17 Which of these words is a participle? (What, Following) 
18 Which is the title of a Jane Austen novel? (Emma, Wuthering Heights) 
19 What does the architectural feature known as an atrium 
traditionally lack? 
(Ceiling, Frames) 
20 Which of these artists painted The Scream? (Edvard Munch, Edgar Degas) 
 
 25 
 
 
Appendix 2: Gambling Task Deck Design (Incomplete Information) 
 
Card 
Order 
A B Card Order A B 
1 +1.00 +0.50 26 +1.00 +0.50 
2 +1.00 +0.50, -1.00 27 +1.00,  -6.00 +0.50, -.500 
3 +1.00, -2.00 +0.50 28 +1.00 +0.50 
4 +1.00 +0.50 29 +1.00 +0.50,  -1.00 
5 +1.00, -7.50 +0.50, -1.00 30 +1.00 +0.50 
6 +1.00 +0.50,  31 +1.00,  -11.00 +0.50,  -1.50  
7 +1.00,  +0.50 32 +1.00  +0.50 
8 +1.00, -3.00 +0.50 33 +1.00  +0.50 
9 +1.00 +0.50, -0.50 34 +1.00,  -1.50 +0.50 
10 +1.00 +0.50  35 +1.00 +0.50,  -.50  
11 +1.00 +0.50 36 +1.00 +0.50 
12 +1.00, -6.00 +0.50 37 +1.00 +0.50,  -.50 
13 +1.00 +0.50 38 +1.00 +0.50 
14 +1.00, -1.00 +0.50, -1.00 39 +1.00 +0.50 
15 +1.00, -4.50 +0.50 40 +1.00 +0.50 
16 +1.00 +0.50, -1.00 41 +1.00 +0.50 
17 +1.00 +0.50, -0.50 42 +1.00,-3.50 +0.50, -2.00 
18 +1.00, -1.00 +0.50 43 +1.00 +0.50 
19 +1.00 +0.50 44 +1.00 +0.50,  -.50 
20 +1.00 +0.50 45 +1.00,  -5.00 +0.50 
21 +1.00 +0.50, -0.50 46 +1.00 +0.50 
22 +1.00, -6.50 +0.50 47 +1.00, -4.00 +0.50 
23 +1.00 +0.50, -0.50 48 +1.00 +0.50 
24 +1.00 +0.50 49 +1.00 +0.50 
25 +1.00 +0.50 50 +1.00 +0.50 
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Gambling Task Decks (complete information) 
 
 
           Choice          Choice                Choice      Choice                    Choice                Choice  
  1   2  3             4               5                         6 
A B C D E F G H I J K L 
+1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +3.00 +1.00 +4.00 +2.00 +1.00 +4.00 +1.00 +1.00  +0.50 
+1.00  +0.50 +0.50 +2.00 +0.50 +2.00 +2.00 +0.50 +1..00 +1.00 +1.00 +0.50 
+1.00 +0.50 +0.50 +2.00 +0.50 +2.00 +2.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 
+1.00 +0.50 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 
+1.00 +0.50 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 
+1.00 +0.50 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +1.00 +0.5- +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 
+1.00 +0.50 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 +1.00 +0.50 
+1.00 +0.50  0.00 -2.00 -0.50 -22.00 -2.00  0.00 -3.00 -0.50 +1.00 +0.50 
-4.00  0.00 -0.50 -3.00 -0.50 -4.00 -4.00 -0.50 -4.00 -0.50 -4.00  0.00 
-4.00 -0.50 -0.50 -6.00 -0.50 -7.00 -4.00 -0.50 -4.00 -0.50 -4.00 -0.00 
 
 
 
 
